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COGNITIVE FACULTIES, COGNITIVE PROCESSES, 
AND THE HOLY SPIRIT IN PLANTINGA'S 
WARRANT SERIES. 
Andrew Dole 
In Warranted Christian Belief; Alvin Plantinga argues that much of what 
Christians believe may well amount to knowledge. His argument for this 
claim is based on the criterion for warrant developed in Warrant: the Current 
Debate and Warrant and Proper Function. However, while in the first two vol-
Ulnes of the series this criterion was applied exclusively to human cognitive 
faculties, the argument of the third volume depends on the principle that the 
criterion can be applied to cognitive processes in general. I argue, by means of 
counterexamples, that cognitive processes will not necessarily produce war-
ranted beliefs even if they satisfy the criterion for warrant as this applies to 
cognitive faculties. After a discussion of one proposal to address this problem, 
I offer a solution which avoids the claim that beliefs produced by the Internal 
Instigation of the Holy Spirit are warranted because they satisfy Plantinga's 
criterion for warrant, but reaches behind the criterion to find the warrant for 
such beliefs to be a direct result of their origin in God. 
I 
In the first two volumes of his Warrant series, Alvin Plantinga developed a 
general criterion for warrant, the property which makes a case of true belief 
into a case of knowledge. In the third book of the series, he argues that 
much of what Christians believe may well be warranted according to the 
same criterion. However, between the second and third volumes of the 
series, a major alteration takes place in the use of the criterion. Whereas the 
criterion was formulated, in the first two volumes, with reference to beliefs 
produced by internal human cognitive faculties, Plantinga now takes it to 
apply to beliefs produced by cognitive processes in general. The proposal of 
the third volume of the series hinges upon this broadening of the range of 
application of the criterion, for the beliefs which Plantinga argues may well 
be items of knowledge for Christians are produced, not by human cognitive 
faculties, but by a cognitive process iIlstigated by the Holy Spirit. 
I will argue that it cannot simply be assumed that a criterion which 
determines whether beliefs produced by cognitive faculties are warranted 
can perform the same function with respect to cognitive processes. 
Cognitive faculties are a subset of the set of cognitive processes, a subset 
whose members we are to a certain extent familiar and comfortable with. 
But the larger set of imaginable cognitive processes contains members 
which bear little if any resemblance to our own cognitive faculties. A belief 
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produced by a non-faculty cognitive process which meets the criterion for 
warrant may well suffer from defects sufficient to suggest that the belief 
should not be considered warranted. 
II 
To begin the argument, let's briefly recall Plantinga's criterion for warrant 
as it is found at the beginning of Warrant and Proper Function . 
.. as I see it, a belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been produced 
in me by cognitive faculties that are working properly (functioning as 
they ought to, subject to no cognitive dysfunction) in a cognitive 
environment that is appropriate for my kinds of cognitive faculties, 
(2) the segment of the design plan governing the production of that 
belief is aimed at the production of true beliefs, and (3) there is a high 
statistical probability that a belief produced under those conditions 
will be true.' 
This criterion is offered in a shortened form in Warranted Christian Belief 
Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that 
belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly 
(subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appro-
priate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan 
that is successfully aimed at truth. ' 
How does Plantinga understand the sbift in the criterion's application? 
The first explicit mention of this shift occurs in an exchange with Keith 
Lehrer which took place during the interval before the publication of WCB. 
Lehrer argues that "on Plantinga's account [as found in WPFj it is beyond 
the power of anyone, even God, to bypass our usual cognitive faculties and 
give us knowledge". Plantinga responds, "can't J take tbis to be a special 
limiting case of cognitive faculties or belief-producing processes function-
ing properly? God instills a true belief in you, intending in doing so to 
instill in you a true belief. Why can't I think of his doing that as itself a 
belief-producing process, especially since that is precisely what it is? True, 
this belief isn't exactly produced by a cognitive faculty, or at least by one of 
my cognitive faculties; but it is produced by a properly functioning cogni-
tive process, and I think that's sufficient." 3 
This gives us some understanding of what Plantinga means by a 'cogni-
tive process': roughly, any process which results in the existence of a belief 
in an individual. While a formal definition or detailed description of cog-
nitive processes is not offered in WCB, Plantinga classifies tbe particular 
activity of the Holy Spirit producing beliefs in individuals as a cognitive 
process under the following rubric: it is "a cognitive device, a means by 
which belief, and belief on a certain specific set of topics, is regularly pro-
duced in regular ways"; commenting in a footnote, "Although this regular-
ity is typical of cognitive processes, it isn't really necessary"." So the class 
of cognitive processes turns out to be quite broad; in fact, about the only 
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feature which a thing must have to qualify as a cognitive process is the fea-
ture that it produces a belief." 
Now the notion that the criterion for warrant could have 'extensions' is 
not introduced for the first time in WCB. At the close of Warral1t: The 
Current Debate, Plantinga discusses the possibility of such extensions: 
What 1 propose to explain and explore is our notion of warrant, a 
notion nearly all of us have and employ in our everyday pursuits. 
The notion is not best explained, I think, just by producing a set of 
severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions .... What we really 
have are paradigms: central, clear, and unequivocal cases of knowl-
edge and warrant. But there is also a sort of prenumbral zone of pos-
sibJe cases surrounding the central cases; these cases don't conform 
exactly to the conditions characterizing the central cases, but are 
instead related by way of analogical extension and similarity .... 
Accordingly, a good way to characterize our notion of warrant 
(more precisely: our system of analogically related concepts of war-
rant) is to specify the conditions governing the central paradigmatic 
core (here necessary and sufficient conditions are appropriate) 
together with some of the analogicaJ extensions and an explanation 
of the analogical basis for the extension." 
On this model, what is offered in Warrant and Proper FUllction is not a cri-
terion for warrant as such: rather, it is a criterion for the central core of 'our 
notion of warrant'. The shift from cognitive faculties to cognitive process-
es, I suggest, is best seen as an 'analogical extension' of the core criterion 
for warrant. The basis for the extension, then, is the analogy (similarity) 
between cognitive faculties and cognitive processes; and Plantinga appears 
to hold that these two are similar enough that the core criterion for warrant 
can be applied without alteration to cognitive processes in general. 
The non-faculty cogniti\·e process which is at the heart of Warranted 
Christian Belief is the "internal instigation (or testimony) of the Holy Spirit", 
which I'll refer to in this essay as the IIHS. This process, which (by hypoth-
esis) produces belief in the truths of Christianity, is described as the middle 
tier of a larger, three-tiered cognitive process. The first tier is Scripture, 
which contains the truths \'\'hich God has revealed to humankind. The 
final tier is faith, or (in Calvin's words) "a firm and certain knowledge of 
God's benevolence towards us ... both revealed to our minds and sealed 
upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit". The middle tier involves the 
activity of the Holy Spirit causing, on the occasion of a person's encounter-
ing one of the truths of Christianity in Scripture, the belief that the proposi-
tion in question is true (as well as a correlated affective response).' 
In light of this description of tl1e IlHS, I think a brief word is in order 
about how the core criterion is to be understood. As stated, the criterion 
requires that the cognitive environment be appropriate for my kind of cog-
nitive faculties, even though the criterion, as stated, doesn't restrict the cog-
nitive faculties in question to my cognitive faculties.' In practice, however, 
the relevant cognitive environment for the determination of warrant is 
determined with reference to the particular cognitive faculty being exer-
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cised." So it seems to me that the criterion should be understood as requir-
ing a link between the (types of) cognitive faculties under consideration 
and the cognitive environments whose suitability is required. The core cri-
terion deals with my cognitive faculties and requires that the cognitive 
environment be suitable for my kinds of cognitive faculties; the 'analogical 
extension' will consist of shift from a concern with my cognitive faculties 
and the environments relevant to their exercise to a concern with cognitive 
processes and the environments relevant to their exercise. 
If it is correct to see the comparison between our cognitive faculties 
(memory, introspection, sense perception, and so on) and the IIHS as based 
on an analogy between cognitive faculties and non-faculty cognitive process-
es, then the claim which is at issue is an 'Analogical Extension to Processes': 
(AEP) Cognitive processes which are not cognitive faculties will be 
warrant-conferring just in case they satisfy the conditions for 
warrant as these apply to cognitive faculties. 
Now (AEP) is a broad claim indeed, and one might wonder if Plantinga 
does indeed hold such a position. On examination, the project of WeB 
seems to turn on this principle, or some principle like it. 10 But its breadth is 
growLds for concern. One suspects that there will be cases in which (AEP) 
will pronounce as warranted beliefs which there are good reasons to think 
ought not be pronounced warranted. This is precisely what I will argue. 
III 
The strategy I'll be pursuing is to offer examples of non-faculty cognitive 
processes which satisfy principle (AEP) but are exotic enough that we 
should have doubts about whether they could produce knowledge. The 
examples will grow increasingly baroque as the essay progresses, and in 
fact more exotic examples than the ones I'll present are conceivable. A few 
examples should be enough to make the point. 
Here There Be Elephants. The first example makes use of a cognitive 
process described by Plantinga himself. 
Suddenly and without your knowledge you are transported to an 
environment wholly different from earth; you awake on a planet 
revolving around Alpha Centauri. There conditions are quite differ-
ent; elephants, we may suppose, are invisible to human beings, but 
emit a sort of radiation .... Imagine that the radiation emitted causes 
human beings to form the belief... that there is a large grey object in 
the neighborhood. Again, an elephant wanders by; while seeing 
nothing of any particular interest, you suddenly find yourself with 
the belief that there is a large grey object nearby. A bit perplexed at 
this discovery, you examine your surroundings more closely: you 
still see no large grey object. Your faculties are displaying no mal-
function ... you are not being epistemically careless or slovenly; never-
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theless you don't know that there is a large grey object nearby. The 
belief has little by way of warrant for you .... 
And the reason is not far to seek: it is that your cognitive faculties 
and the environment in which you find yourself are not properly 
attuned. ll 
Plantinga describes this case, at the outset of his second volume, as an 
example of the production of unwarranted beliefs. However, once the cri-
terion for warrant is expanded to include belief forming processes, the 
beliefs produced in this example will be warranted, provided that one 
small addition is made to the description. 
Suppose that the radiation emitted by Alpha Centauri elephants pro-
duces the belief that a large grey object is in the neighborhood within all 
animals in close proximity to elephants, and does so reliably (most of the 
time). More specifically, suppose this process had been designed to produce 
such beliefs'2- for the purpose of scaring away competitors for food, 
predators, or animals susceptible of being damaged if stepped on. In this 
case we could clearly say that, were a human to be haplessly transported to 
this planet, his belief that there is a large grey animal in the neighborhood 
would be warranted according to (AEP), and if held strongly enough, 
would constitute knowledge. It would be (1) produced by a properly func-
tioning cognitive process (the process produces such beliefs when func-
tioning properly), within an appropriate cognitive environment (the 
process is designed to function upon animals on Alpha Centauri); (2) the 
segment of the design plan governing the process is directly aimed at the 
production of true beliefs; and (3) the design plan is a good one, since we 
are supposing that the radiation succeeds most of the time in producing 
the requisite belief. 
Note that the reason Plantinga gives for denying that such beliefs have 
warrant- that "your cognitive faculties and the environment in which you 
find yourself are not properly attuned"- would be, in effect, overruled by 
the broadening specified by (AEP). If cognitive processes in general can be 
warrant-conferring, there is no need whatsoever for my cognitive faculties 
to be properly attuned to the cognitive environment (local or global) for me 
to have warranted beliefs. 13 
Brain-in-a-V {It 1. Suppose you are a brain in a vat, with your nerve-end-
ings hooked up to electric wires in the traditional manner. Suppose further 
that the scientists who are responsible for your well-being have devised the 
following procedure. A technician sits at a console beside the vat in which 
you reside, watching a small screen on which symbols flash periodically. 
Whenever the symbol 'n' appears on the screen, the technician presses a 
button marked 'n' on the control panel. This button activates a complicat-
ed algorithm whose termination is the production of a belief in your noetic 
structure that the symbol 'n' is appearing on a screen somewhere. 
This belief, too, would be warranted under the analogical extension of 
the core criterion to cognitive processes generally, and if held strongly 
enough would constitute knowledge. As in the Alpha Centauri case, it 
would be (1) produced by a properly functioning cognitive process (the 
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process produces such beliefs when functioning properly), within an 
appropriate cognitive environment (the process is designed to function in 
brain-in-a-vat cases); (2) the segment of the design plan governing the 
process would be directly aimed at the production of true beliefs; and (3) 
the design plan would be a good one, since the process generally succeeds 
in producing the desired belief in you. 
Brain-in-a-Vat 2. Suppose that the technician is still responding to the 
symbol 'n' on the screen, but the button on the console is not marked 'n' 
but 'Feike', and suppose that pressing the button produces a belief in you 
that 'Feike is a Frisian'. Furthermore, suppose Feike is in fact a Frisian- he 
is chief scientist on the project, designer of the whole experiment, and 
everyone involved knows (is warranted in believing and believes firmly) 
that he is a Frisian. 
Once again, the belief in question would be (1) produced by a properly 
functioning cognitive process, within an appropriate cognitive environ-
ment; (2) the segment of the design plan governing the process would be 
directly aimed at the production of true beliefs; and (3) the design plan 
would be a good one, since it would in fact produce true beliefs. So in this 
case as well, your belief would be warranted under (AEP). 
Braill-in-a-Vat 3. Suppose there is not just one belief-producing button 
on the console but many, each with its own label, and each one producing 
a true belief in you- one produces the belief 'Feike is a Frisian', another 
produces the belief 'Kant rarely left Konigsberg', still another '-(P&-P)" 
and so on. Suppose that whenever the symbol'n' appears on the computer 
screen, the technician presses one of these buttons at random, thereby pro-
ducing in you a true belief. 
These beliefs will not be 'accidentally' true; each proposition will have 
been carefully examined and approved by a crack team of philosophers, 
geographers, logicians and so on. These beliefs would, according to (AEP), 
be warranted- they would be (1) produced by a properly functioning 
cognitive process, within an appropriate cognitive environment, according 
to (2) a segment of a design plan directly aimed at the production of true 
beliefs; and (3) the design plan would be a good one (there would be a high 
statistical probability that the beliefs so produced would be true). 
Braill-in-a-Vat 4. Suppose the many true-belief-producing buttons on 
the console are arranged in linear fashion, much like a piano keyboard, 
each again with its own label, and (we may suppose) each producing a 
tone of a certain pitch (designed to indicate to Feike, whose bench is in the 
next room, what you believe at any given moment). Further, suppose that 
the night-shift technician invites some of his friends to come around one 
night and see what he does for a living, and that once they arrive he sits 
down at the console, rolls up his sleeves, and announces that he is about to 
produce some true beliefs in you (who are all this time helplessly floating 
in the vat). Thereupon he begins to play selections from Rigoletto upon the 
true-belief-producing buttons, whilst singing at the top of his lungs. 
Finally, suppose our technician has only fair to middling talents as a 
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pianist, often missing the specific keys he intends to press. 
In this case as well, each of the beliefs produced in you will be (1) pro-
duced by a properly functioning cognitive process within an appropriate 
cognitive environment; (2) governed by a design-plan segment directly 
aimed at truth (the teclmician's declared intent is, after all, to produce true 
beliefs in you); and (3) the design plan would be a good one, evinced by 
the fact that all the beliefs produced would be non-accidentally true. So in 
this case as well, application of (AEP) would result in the conclusion that 
these beliefs would be warranted, and if held firmly enough would consti-
tute knowledge. 
IV 
Now all of these examples involve cases where (AEP) is satisfied; and yet I 
take it that few would think that the beliefs produced in all of the exam-
ples ought to be thought of as warranted. The examples trade on the fact 
that there are very many imaginable cognitive processes which are so dif-
ferent from human cognitive faculties that it is difficult to imagine any sit-
uation in which we would be willing to grant that these processes could 
produce what we think of as knowledge, even if the requirements of the 
core criterion for warrant were met. Certainly, more exotic examples than 
those I've presented above are imaginable; so certainly, (AEP) needs to be 
qualified in some way. 
Now it seems to me that the move from cognitive faculties to cognitive 
processes shouldn't be rejected outright; that is, I think it's likely that there 
are imaginable non-faculty cognitive processes whose deliverances, in 
cases where the core criterion for warrant is met, might plausibly be 
thought of as cases of knowledge, and in the end the IlHS might well tum 
out to be one of these. But the claim that the IIHS does fall within this class 
is somewhat hollow if we cannot say what distinguishes non-faculty cogni-
tive processes which might well produce warranted beliefs (when the core 
criterion for warrant is satisfied) from those which look as though their 
deliverances should not be considered candidates for knowledge. 
So it seems to me that the counterexamples expose a gap in Plantinga's 
argument. If this is conceded, there are two ways to respond to the prob-
lem. The first involves deploying further argumentative resources to close 
this gap, arguing that a restricted version of (AEP) can be derived which 
the IIHS satisfies. The second involvcs looking for an alternativc to 
reliance on (AEP) or any similar principle to secure the claim that beliefs 
produced by the IIHS can be warranted. I'll spend some time outlining 
what I think the first response would involve before recommending the 
second as the more profitable of the two. 
One could attempt to derive a restricted form of (AEP) along the follow-
ing lines. It's reasonable to think that cognitive processes which are similar 
to human cognitive processes will be more likely to produce knowledge 
when they satisfy the core criterion for warrant than those which are not. 
Probably not all of the features of cognitive faculties are relevant to the 
determination of warrant; it may well make no difference whether a facul-
ty is part of our 'original equipment' or is acquired with experience or 
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implanted by God, for example-so we will want to say that a non-faculty 
cognitive process must be relevantly similar to human cognitive faculties if 
its deliverances are to be acknowledged as possibly warranted. That is, it 
is likely that there are certain features of cognitive faculties which account 
for the fact that their deliverances, where the core criterion is satisfied, are 
warranted; and the lack of some or all of these features is what accounts for 
the fact that very exotic cognitive processes are not likely to produce war-
ranted beliefs even when they satisfy the core criterion. 
So what is needed is a grasp of which features of our human cognitive 
faculties are essential for the purpose of producing warranted beliefs. 
Assuming we could somehow derive a list of such features, a broader crite-
rion for warrant could then be constructed: for a non-faculty cognitive 
process to produce warranted beliefs, it would have to exhibit the relevant 
features as well as satisfy the core criterion. With such a broader criterion 
in hand, all that would remain would be the argument that the IIH5 
exhibits the necessary features. 
It's not clear to me that such an argument could be mounted; certainly, 
it would involve quite a bit of work with no guarantee of success. To indi-
viduate our cognitive faculties and identify the features of each one is no 
small task; Plantinga himself admits that an adequate treatment of anyone 
faculty would require substantial careful work. 14 Further, as Plantinga 
himself notes, there is no agreement on the extent of 'our cognitive estab-
lishment'.L' While there is agreement among some parties to isolate certain 
of the more important faculties for the purpose of philosophical treatment, 
very different accounts have been offered of the makeup of these faculties. 
So it would not be easy to produce a list of our cognitive faculties and their 
various features which would not itself be subject to dispute, and thus of 
limited usefulness for the purpose of defending the claim that Christian 
belief can be warranted. Furthermore, it is not at all clear what procedure 
one would follow to distinguish features which are essential to the confer-
ral of warrant upon a faculty's productions, and which inessential. Now 
certainly if the project appears interesting, then hands will be found to do 
the necessary work; this way of attempting to close the gap might very 
well succeed in the end. But such a project could barely even be started in 
the present essay. 
v 
But is such a response, after all, so much as needed? Just where does the 
objection that not all cognitive processes which satisfy the core criterion 
will produce warranted beliefs leave the project of Warranted Christian 
Belief. Is the 'gap' which I've attempted to point out really a threat to 
Plantinga's aims? 
Let's recall the fact that the argument which Planting a is most con-
cerned to offer in the third volume is, in the end, an unresolved condition-
al, essentially: 
(A) If Christianity is true, and if God has instituted something 
like the IIH5 as a way of informing believers about the great 
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truths of the Gospel, then a good bit of what Christians 
believe may well be warranted. 
The intent of this conditional is to show that any de jure objections 
against Christian beliefs collapse into the de facto objection: that is, if the 
conditional is true, then the only way to demonstrate that Christian belief 
suffers, in every case, from certain defects other than falsity (irrationality, 
lack of warrant, and so on) is to demonstrate that Christian beljef is false. 16 
Now the argument presented here doesn't show that the conditional is 
false; but it does add a further specification to the conditional which must 
be satisfied if the de facto and de jure arguments are to be successfully col-
lapsed. If the defense of the IIHS suggested above were to be undertaken, 
it might be discovered in the end that the IIHS does possess the relevant 
features of cognitive faculties which are necessary to insure that its produc-
tions can be warranted; so it might well turn out that, if the antecedents of 
Plantinga's conditional is true, then the consequent is true also. But as stat-
ed, (A) lacks one necessary condition. The argument I've presented should 
be seen as revising (A) to read: 
(B) If Christianity is true, and if God has instituted something 
like the IIHS as a way of informing believers about the great 
truths of the Gospel, and if something like the IIHS is rele-
vantly similar" to human cognitive faculties for the purpos-
es of determining warrant, then a good bit of what Christians 
believe may well be warranted. 
Now this is hardly a crushing blow to Plantinga's project; but it should 
be noted that the new condition in (B) differs from the original one in two 
important respects. Both the claim that Christianity is true and that God 
instills faith in some individuals are consonant with the Reformed 
Christian tradition. But the claim that the sort of divine activity specified 
by the IIHS is similar to human cognitive faculties in important but 
unspecified respects is not a claim which has the backing of any significant 
part of the Christian or philosophical traditions. Further, while the truth of 
the first condition (the truth of Christianity) not only makes the truth of the 
second condition possible but in fact makes it rather likely, it does not 
seem to me that the truth of Christianity or the existence of something like 
the IIHS would make it more likely that the IlHS would have the requisite 
set of features in common with our cognitive faculties than if the IIHS 
'existed only in the understanding'. If the gap in the argument is to be 
closed, it looks as though more in the way of argument will be needed than 
the supposition of the truth of Christianity, or even the truth of Plantinga's 
"extended Aquinas-Calvin model" of faith.'s 
Now a rejoinder is possible here. One might think that the gap which I 
claim to have pointed out- between the claim that cognitive faculties 
which satisfy the core criterion for warrant will produce warranted beliefs, 
and the claim that a cognitive process carried out by God upon an individ-
ual will do the same- doesn't amount to much at all, when viewed in 
light of the supposition that the cognitive agent in question is, after all, 
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God. Can't what we know about God--{)mnipotence, omniscience, and so 
on-assuage any worries that we might have about the epistemic stahlS of 
beliefs produced directly by God in an individual? Do we really need the 
argument that such beliefs would be warranted to be airtight to believe, 
reasonably, that they would be warranted? If Plantinga's argument gets us 
close to seeing how such beliefs can constitute knowledge, can't we just say 
that something like the IIHS will just not suffer from any of the defects 
which we can imagine characterizing very exotic cognitive processes, 
because God possesses all perfections and no defects? 
I think that this is broadly correct; it seems to me that, if we are suppos-
ing the truth of Christianity, beliefs produced by something like the IIHS 
will be highly desirable epistemically. But let me point out that such a 
response does not close the gap in Plantinga's argument, but jumps it, leav-
ing it in place. It amounts to saying, in essence, "well, we know not how, 
but we trust that God's power (and omniscience) is enough to jump this 
gap and give us warranted beliefs". Relying on such a proposition at this 
important juncture would certainly be out of step with the rest of 
Plantinga's argument; it seems to me that it would amount to giving faith 
not only the last, but the strategically crucial-but somewhat imprecise-
word in what is otherwise a rigorous philosophical argument. 
VI 
There is a way, however, to give the sentiments expressed in this response 
a bit more in the way of philosophical backbone. It seems to me that rest-
ing the claim that the IIHS produces warranted beliefs on principle (AEP) 
is problematic enough that, if a more elegant way to accomplish the same 
aim can be found, then the better part of valor would be to abandon it. 
And there are resources within Plantinga's own work on whose basis one 
could defend the epistemic merits of beliefs produced by something like 
the IJHS without appeal to a principle like (AEP). What I have in mind 
involves not an alteration of the core criterion for warrant, but a readjust-
ment of the central paradigm of knowledge, based on an appreciation of 
what the Christian tradition tells us about God and of the differences 
between human and divine knowledge. 
In his article entitled "Divine Knowledge", published in the same year 
as the first two volumes of the Warrant series, Plantinga addresses the rcla-
tion between human and divine knowledge. One difference, he argues, is 
that the process whereby human beings come to have warranted beliefs 
requires supposing that human cognitive faculties have been designed to 
function in a certain way; but no such supposition is to be thought neces-
sary with respect to God's knowledge. In fact, our having any knowledge 
at all-our being designed at all, for example-depends on God's knowing 
how to design beings with reliable cognitive faculties, and knowing how to 
set up a world of things that could be known by such beings. 1/ An impor-
tant difference between God and us is that our knowledge presupposes 
knowledge on the part of someone else; his does not."l'i 
Furthermore, unlike our knowledge, God's knowledge doesn't come by 
way of Ifollowing the causal channels' according to which the world runs. 
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Plantinga puts the point thus: "Our knowledge ... is indeed derivative; and 
it goes by way of the various causal structures and channels God has estab-
lished .... But [Cod's] knowledge does not go by way of these causal con-
nections (or any other); Cod's knowledge precedes the causal connections in 
the world."20 And in exploring the question of whether there's anything 
equivalent to the regular functioning of cognitive faculties in Cod's case, 
Plantinga concludes: "if in an analogical sense we say that there is a way 
in which Cod's knowledge works, then, so far as we can see, that way is 
given by his being necessarily omniscient"." 
According to this account, God's knowledge is not subject to any of the 
restrictions to which our knowledge is subject, and God's knowledge is a 
precondition for our knowledge in several ways. This picture suggests a 
way of understanding the relation between divine and human knowledge 
which offers an alternative to the defense of the IIHS suggested above. I 
would like to say (perhaps tugging on a fugitive stand of Christian 
Platonism in Reformed thought) that this picture suggests that Cod's 
knowledge is a higher form of knowledge than human knowledge. God's 
knowledge is superior to our own in its range, presumably the certainty 
with which it is held, and its accuracy with respect to the details of what is 
known; and our knowledge is essentially dependent upon God's knowl-
edge. Without God's knowledge (superior to our own) of the things which 
we know and other things, we could know nothing. 
Why do I think this is relevant to the project of the Warrant series? Well, 
Plantinga understands warrant to be a matter of a belief's credentials. 
Throughout the three volumes of the series, these credentials have been 
lmderstood with reference to the ways in which humans ordinarily come 
to know things; satisfying the core criterion for warrant is a way of dis-
playing good epistemic credentials. But according to the picture sketched 
just above, items of God's knowledge, even though they do not (so far as 
we know) come by way of properly-functioning cognitive faculties in Cod, 
have far better credentials than any of our own beliefs could ever have. 
Cod's beliefs don't have to satisfy any criteria to count as items of knowl-
edge. Any belief held by Cod will be true, and infallibly so, and will not 
suffer from any imaginable defects in the area of credentials. 
At the beginning of this essay, 1 mentioned the fact that Plantinga sees 
himself as describing the paradigm-center of our common notion of 
knowledge by way of the core criterion for warrant. But when the discus-
sion turns explicitly theistic, as it does in the third volume, one might want 
the center of this paradigm to be occupied not by human knowledge, but 
by Cod's knowledge. That is, suppose we argued in the following way: 
Cod's knowledge is the center of our paradigm for knowledge: infallibly 
and non-accidentally true, with no need to inquire into its history to evalu-
ate its epistemic credentials, and so on. Cod's knowledge is the best, high-
est sort of knowledge we could possibly imagine. Our knowledge gets its 
good credentials by way of being produced in a certain way: namely, in a 
way captured by Plantinga's core criterion for warrant. But even when one 
of 'our' beliefs has as much warrant, and is held as firmly, as is humanly 
possible, it is still lower than any item of God's knowledge: it is not the 
case, for example, that the proposition in question is true if and only if we 
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know it, and our knowing it is essentially dependent upon God's knowing 
and doing a great many things. 
On this view, how would one evaluate a belief produced by a 'cognitive 
process' such as the IlHS? It certainly seems to me that the mere fact that 
the belief is implanted in a person directly by God gives this belief good 
credentials. In fact, it seems to me that the credentials of a belief produced 
in this way, while they may not be as impressive as items of God's own 
knowledge, will be more impressive than those of beliefs produced by our 
own cognitive faculties (I certainly think of God as more reliable than my 
own memory, or faculty of a priori knowledge, or ability to reason ... ). In 
fact, I find it difficult to imagine better credentials for an item of human 
knowledge besides its being produced directly by God. If beliefs produced 
by our co~,'nitive faculties deserve to be called knowledge when they dis-
play satisfactory epistemic credentials, then beliefs produced directly by 
God, it seems to me, have even more right to the title-whether or not they 
satisfy the criterion for warrant as this applies to the productions of our 
cognitive faculties. So beliefs produced by something like the IIHS will be 
warranted, and if held firmly enough will constitute knowledge-and this 
without an analogical extension of the core criterion for warrant to cogni-
tive processes in general. 
A few possible misunderstandings concerning this alternative sugges-
tion can be averted by drawing attention to the fact that the proposal I am 
advancing here is fairly modest in scope. For example, I am not proposing 
a replacement for Plantinga's IIHS as the source of the Christian's knowl-
edge of the truths of Christianity. L am merely offering an alternative 
account of why beliefs produced in the way specified by the TlHS are war-
ranted. Nothing about my proposal suggests that God works any differ-
ently than the way Plantinga suggests when instilling faith in individuals. 
My proposal makes no particular claims about whether or when God actu-
ally does instill beliefs in individuals, merely discussing the epistemic sta-
tus of beliefs thus produced. 
It might be thought that my proposal makes Scripture inessential to the 
process whereby individuals come to know the truths of Christianity, 
whereas on Plantinga's original proposal Scripture is essential. It seems to 
me, however, that on both Plantinga's and my accounts, Scripture is essen-
tial to Christian knowledge only to the extent that God decides to make it 
so. According to Planting a, Scripture is essential to the TIHS in the sense 
that if Scripture is not involved in a particular instance of belief-produc-
tion, then this will not turn out to be an instance of the IIHS. But nothing 
about Plantinga's account suggests that God cannot bypass the IIHS alto-
gether, and produce beliefs by way of another sort of cognitive process 
(even in Christians), and if that cognitive process satisfies the core criterion 
for warrant as expanded by (AEP), beliefs so produced will be warranted. 
There is no particular reason to think that Cod could not engage in non-
IIHS cognitive processes which would satisfy these requirements; in fact, it 
is difficult to imagine a case where God directly inspires a true belief in an 
individual that could not be described in such a way as to meet these 
requirements. So on Plantinga's original description, Scripture is essential 
to warranted Christian belief onJy to the extent that God makes it a policy 
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only to produce belief in the truths of Christianity by way of the ITHS 
rather than by other means. 
So too on my proposal, if God has made it a policy only to inspire belief 
in the truths of Christianity upon the occasion of those truths being read in 
Scripture (that is, by way of the lIHS), then Scripture is essential to warrant-
ed Christian belief. But should God decide to produce beliefs directly in 
individuals in a manner which bypasses Scripture, God can certainly do so, 
and my proposal explains why beliefs produced in this manner will be war-
ranted.12 
Another possible misunderstanding can be averted here by the reminder 
that Plantinga's intent, which this proposal maintains, is to be thoroughgo-
inglyextemalist: it is no part of Plantinga's proposal to argue that human 
beings have internal access to the fact of the matter about which of their 
beliefs constitute knowledge. If a belief satisfies the core criterion, then it is 
warranted, regardless of the believer's awareness of the belief's epistemic 
merits. So too, my proposal does not involve any believers' being aware that 
a particular belief has been implanted in them directly by God, and thus 
does not involve an evaluation of the epistemic merits of a belief which a 
believer merely takes to be the result of God's direct influence. And just as 
celtainly, the proposal does not invite the thought that any believers could 
justifiably claim to know a particular fact due to God's direct activity, and 
thus with God's authority. Rather, the proposal specifies that in the cases in 
question the beliefs in question have in fact been implanted directly by God, 
regardless of the individual's own awareness (or lack thereof) of that fact. In 
addition, nothing I have said suggests that beliefs produced directly by God 
are not susceptible to 'intemalist' evaluation, defeat or undercutting, and so 
on. On Plantinga's own proposal, warranted beliefs in general are suscepti-
ble to such challenges. So regardless of whether Plantinga's account or my 
own of why beliefs produced by the IIHS are warranted is viewed as the 
more plausible, Christian belief still faces the challenges of Freud and Marx, 
historical criticism, postmodernism, pluralism, and so on. Plantinga argues 
that all of these challenges can be met, and it seems to me that my alteration 
to his proposal docs not significantly affect his arguments in this regard.23 
I take it that the line of thought I have proposed offers a way around the 
difficulties involved in defending a principle such as (AEP). It offers 
another way to achieve Plantinga's aim: to collapse de jure objections to 
Christian belief into de facto objections. Beliefs implanted directly by God 
will have a good deal of warrant, and if held strongly enough will consti-
tute knowledge, whether or not this takes place by way of a cognitive 
process which can be positively evaluated according to the criterion of 
warrant which applies to our own cognitive faculties. Thus, if God (as 
understood by Christianity) exists, and if God is in the business of instilling 
faith (understood along the lines of Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin 
model) in individuals, then Christian belief very likely amounts to knowl-
edge. If the rest of Plantinga's arguments hold, then the only way to chal-
lenge this conclusion is to argue eitller that God does not exist, or that God 
is not in the business of instilling faith.2• 
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